Greg Detre
Wednesday, 15 May, 2002
the �standard� view of Hume on causation is that:
Hume thought that there is no more to causality than regularity of succession (this is the Regularity theory of causation)
e.g. �Hume�s conclusion [is] that so far as the external objects which are causes and effects are concerned there is only constant conjunction� (Woolhouse)
in opposition, Strawson thinks that:
Hume does not hold a Regularity theory of causation
that is, he firmly believed in the existence of something like natural necessity, i.e. the existence of causal power conceived of in some essentially non-Regularity theory way
this is what is meant by calling him a �sceptical realist� � his views on causation are epistemological, rather than metaphysical
is Hume�s belief in (something like) natural necessity/causal power simply an example of his doctrine of natural belief (that there are sorts of things we can't help believing in everyday life, irrespective of our philosophical conclusions, e.g. the existence of external objects)?
Strawson is arguing that �he takes the existence of causal power for granted not only in everyday life but also as a philosopher�
of course, it may be said that one of Hume�s �deepest and most characteristic philosophical claims is that true sceptics must be sceptical of their own sceptical conclusions, and that a philosophy which abandons the fundamental tenets of ordinary, instinctive, common sense natural belief is likely to remain superficial, as a philosophy�
but Strawson is saying that Hume�s belief in something like natural necessity is deducible from the details of his discussion of causation in particular
�it never really occurs to him to doubt the existence of causal power, even when he is operating in his most sceptical mode. That is, it never really occurs to him to question the idea that there must be something about reality which is the reason why it is ordered and regular in the way that it is�
Strawson (in this short cut) is mainly resting his case on the Enquiry
some say that the Enquiry is somehow of less importance than the Treatise, but there is every reaosn to take it as more representative of Hume�s considered views on causation
when he talks of objects, Strawson thinks that Hume meant objects that are genuinely external objects in some sense, with some sort of existence independent of our minds
if he had only been talking about mental representations of objects, then he could have had very good reason to adopt a Regularity theory of causation about them
the main objection to the �standard� view of Hume is that it fails to distinguish between epistemological and ontological notions of causation:
Hume�s
Regularity theory of causation is only a theory about causation so far as we
can know about it or contentfully
conceive of it in the objects, not about causation as it is in the objects
�nature � conceals from us those powers and principles on which the influence of � objects entirely depends� (E33)
we are �ignorant of those powers and forces, on which [the]
regular � succession of objects totally
depends� (E55)
whereas the standard view moves (catastrophically) from saying that:
E1:�������� all we can ever know of causation is regular succession
O1: all
that causation actually is, in the
objects, is regular succession
O1 does not follow from E1
such a positive ontological assertion about the nature of reality is violently at odds with Hume�s scepticism (his strictly non-committal scepticism with respect to knowledge claims about what we can know to exist, or know not to exist, in reality)
Hume�s semantical claim:
S1:�������� all we can possible manage to mean by expressions like (i.e. when we say or write) �causation in the objects� is regular succession
does Hume�s theory of ideas �license the strange claim that all we can suppose a thing to be is what we can detect or experience or know from it, because we cannot manage to mean anything more than what we can detect or experience or know of it when we think or talk�
Strawson says that it is incorrect to say that
Hume�s theory of meaning obliges him to say that we infer something does not
exist from the claim that we can know/conceive nothing about it
like Locke + Newton, Hume thinks we can suppose to exist things/aspects of reality of which we have no positively/descriptively contentful conception
the belief (�natural belief�) that there is some such thing as natural necessity/causal power is not ruled out by a Humean strictly non-commital skepticism about knowledge claims, and indeed such a skepticism can even grant that it may be something like the truth, but it will merely insist that we cannot know it to be true
(� paragraphs above this on page 278???)
since Hume�s is not an �extravagant�, Pyrrhonian �refusal to accept any positive belief-claim at all so long as it is uncertain� skepticism
does Hume claim that the idea of causation as something more than regular succession (i.e. causal power) is quite simply unintelligible?
does he say the same about the notion of realist external objects (i.e. things which are �specifically [i.e. qualitatively] different from perceptions�)?
Strawson thinks that Hume was firmly committed to talking/conceiving of objects in some sort of realist manner
and this is why � when Hume says that X is �unintelligible�:
he uses the word (like Locke) to mean that we cannot form any idea of/term for X which has any positive content
(in the special restricted sense of content specified by the theory of ideas)
he is quite happy to say that there exist aspects of reality that are unknown and unknowable (beyond our powers of comprehension) to us
rather than that X refers to something which is not really anything, or is incoherent
however, in his discussion of conceiving of external realist (i.e. entirely non-mental, mind-independent external physical) objects, he says that it is:
�impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically [i.e. qualitatively] different from ideas and impressions�
but then he says:
�The farthest we can go towards a conception of external objects, when suppos�d specifically different from our perceptions is to form a relative idea of them, without pretending to comprehend the related objects�
i.e. that we can't �comprehend� (etymology: �grasp their real nature in thought�) external objects in any way, on the terms of the theory of ideas
because (on the terms of the theory of ideas) we can form a positively descriptively contentful conception of something only out of impressions-and-ideas material
nevertheless, even if we cannot form any idea of external objects that counts as positively contentful on the terms of the theory of ideas, we can still form a �relative� idea of such objects
relative idea = indirect/not true to their true nature
our relative idea of external objects is as standing in a certain relation (the relation of cause) to our perceptions
i.e. a �relative� idea of X is merely �relationally� of X
e.g. �whatever it was that caused this mess�
using this notion of a �relative� idea, our merely �relative�idea of causal power is something like �that about reality which is in fact the reason why reality is regular in the way that it is�
i.e. �those powers and forces, on which the regular succession � of objects totally depends� (E55)
or �whatever unknown thing it is that is in fact the �reason of the conjunction� of any two objects� (T93)
in this way, we have picked out causal power, and can continue to refer to it, while having absolutely no sort of positively contentful conception of its nature on the terms of the theory of ideas
�we may suppose, but never can conceive a specific difference betwixt an object and an impression� (Treatise, pg 241)
I think Strawson is using this quote to say that we �conceive� ideas that are contentful in the particular terms of the theory of ideas, but we can only �suppose� relative ideas
Strawson thinks that there is decisive textual evidence that, fundamentally, Hume has some sort of realist attitude to the nature of objects (see Treatise I. iv. 2, also T217)
he says he proceeds upon �the supposition [that] there is both an external and an internal world� (T218)
moreover, given that he holds that there is nothing hidden/unknown in perceptions, he must be thinking of objects/bodies as something more than perceptions when he talking of the �secret� or unknown nature/internal structure as distinct from the �sensible qualities� of objects/bodies:
�the perceptions of the mind are perfectly known� whereas �the essence and composition of external bodies are � obscure� (T366)
officially of course, Hume�s Realism is maximally non-commital � only that there is something �external� just in the sense of being independent of, or something other than, our perceptions, that gives rise to them and is the reason they are as they are
this does not decide between Locke vs Berkeley�s account of things, nor require a mind-independent but only a genuinely external reality
Hume thinks that Berkeley�s system is wholly unconvincing, but irrefutable (E155)
�By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects, entirely different from them, though resembling them [as in Locke�s view] �, and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself [as in solipsism], or from the suggestion of some invisible and unknown spirit [as in Berkeley�s view], or from some other cause still more unknown to us [as in Kant�s view]?�
back to causation:
we can form a positively contentful conception of something only out of impression-copy content
there is no impression of causal power to be found in the objects
therefore, no term like �power� or �force� that we employ can ever really manage to (contentfully etc.) mean anything in the objects
such terms can only manage to contentfully mean something in the mind:
that is, the feeling of determination in the mind which we experience on being confronted with regular succession
for this is the impression-source from which our actual idea of power is derived
Hume�s theory of ideas creates some pressure on him to say that the ontological thesis of causation follows from the epistemological one, given his definitions:
first definition: regular succession
second definition: regular succession that gives rise to a feeling of determination or habit of inference in the mind
but his strictly non-commital skepticism creates a far greater pressure to withdraw from making a claim to simply a supposition
but Strawson thinks that a �Meaning Tension� remains in Hume�s thought
he undoubtedly uses terms like �power� and �force� (�Causation terms�) in a way that is arguably ruled out as illegitimate by his theory of ideas (i.e. they refer to causation conceived of in some essentially non-Regularity-theory way)
i.e. he officially holds (following from his theory of ideas) that no Causation term can manage to positively-contentfully mean anything like Causation
yet he clearly concedes, in practice, that they can at least refer to Causation
this is a tension, but not really an inconsistency
in fact, this tension may simply arise out of our slightly different uses of �meaning� and �unintelligible�
causation vs causality???
is Strawson�s position more or less accepted now???
does Strawson describe the �standard� and �sceptical realist� positions in terms of epistemological and metaphysical theses about causality???
yes, see Appendix C etc.
is the Treatise my set text???
ontological vs metaphysical???
where does Hume say that �we can suppose to exist things/aspects of reality of which we have no positively/descriptively contentful conception�, in opposition to Berkeley (�Is it not ... a great contradiction to talk of conceiving a thing which is unconceived?�)???
does he actually argue for this, just state it, or just imply it???
is �causal power� just Strawson�s name for �necessary connection�, or are they importantly different???
Strawson�s blatantly right � when Hume says that we cannot see �necessary connection�, only constant conjunction, he meant that there is no way that events can be causally connected in any way we can understand as certain
in this way, we have picked out causal power, and can continue to refer to it, while having absolutely no sort of positively contentful conception of its nature on the terms of the theory of ideas � but shouldn't we �Commit it [this relative idea of causal power, or any relative ideas] then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion�???
what�s Locke�s resemblance claim???
ontic /"QntIk/ a.M20. [f. Gk ont-, on being (see ONTO-) + -IC.] Philos. Of or pertaining to entities and the facts about them; relating to real as opp. to phenomenal existence.ontical a. = ONTIC M20.ontically adv. M20.
Strawson says that the feeling of determination in the mind which we experience on being confronted with regular succession is the impression-source from which our actual idea of power is derived � but can a sort of mental activity (i.e. the feeling of determination resulting from Custom) be an impression-source??? hmmm � is that what Strawson is saying, or is he simply saying that the regular succession itself is the impression-source (see pg 283)???
see the bit on �Meaning Tension� where Strawson seems to be saying exactly this